Education

The Mobile ID experiment.

Be it Android, Apple, tablet or smart phone … mobile devices are everywhere, and users want to do everything on them that they do on their desktop. As the functionality increases so do the threats to the information stored on and accessed by the devices. The same dangers that plague the desktop world are exacerbated in the mobile world.

Mobile brings convenience, access and portability with a low cost of entry, but it creates a “perfect storm” of risk, explains Juan Duque, principal in the Federal Enterprise Technology Risk Services at Deloitte. “It can be the same risk you see in the non-mobile environment but it can go even deeper,” he says. “The risk universe is expanded.” some aspect of near field communication for identity. The U.S. government is looking at how the communications protocol can be used in connection with PIV and PIV-I credentials, and the enterprise sees it as a solution for converged physical and logical access control.

The challenges with mobile devices and identity are numerous, and after years of discussion, industry finds itself in the midst of a great experiment. Significant issues surround the policies that govern these devices and credentials. Existing policy needs to be changed or created from scratch to deal with challenges the mobile devices presents to an enterprise.

On the technology side many feel it is a foregone conclusion that the mobile will use some aspect of near field communication for identity. The U.S. government is looking at how the communications protocol can be used in connection with PIV and PIV-I credentials, and the enterprise sees it as a solution for converged physical and logical access control.

Solve the ‘where’ before the ‘why’

One of the core issues with credentials on the mobile is where to store it on the device and who controls that area. For followers of near field communication, these issues will sound very familiar.

“Who controls the secure element? Who owns the secure element? What form does it come in?” asks Terry Gold, vice president of U.S. sales at idonDemand.

These questions have plagued the NFC market and delayed adoption as ecosystem players have struggled for control. On the payment and marketing side, there has been some compromise with carriers, financial institutions and handset manufacturers partnering to rollout initial services.

But on the identity and credentialing side it’s not yet clear how this will work and who will control and profit from mobile identity. “You have this big battle shaping up,” Gold says. “If you have a secure element who is going to own and control it? It is not really owned by the end user. Even though he decides what apps and identity elements go on his handset, it’s someone else who provides the security.”

Eventually the secure element will have to be owned by the end user and access granted to any application he sees fit, Gold says.

Secure element options

There are three options for storing identity credentials on a mobile device’s secure element. One would place it on the SIM, a smart card in the handset that is used for identification to the mobile network. This choice is handset agnostic and the mobile operators–such as AT&T, Sprint, Verizon, T-Mobile–control the SIM.

Placing the credential on a microSD card that is inserted into the phone is another option. Many smart phones–Android, Blackberry but not the iPhone–have microSD slots and the credentials could be removed and placed in other handsets if an individual switched devices. In this case the issuer of the microSD card would be its likely owner.

The final option is embedding the secure element into the handset. The handset manufacturer would own this space, and many are already adding this capability to devices. Notably, RIM is going this route with its Blackberry handsets.

To further cloud the issue, it’s also possible that handsets could have more than one secure element, or even all three types, with different owners for each. “Everyone wants control of the secure element in NFC,” Gold says. “On the identity side it gets difficult. If someone else owns that secure element how are you going to put an identity credential on it?”

Will the secure element owner charge a fee to put a credential on the device? Will companies or organizations be willing to pay? Questions abound. The handset as access control card

HID Global has seen these issues arise and is designing a solution that will work in any environment and can manage the credential wherever it is stored, says Karl Weintz, vice president of business development for the mobile access business at HID.

A pilot in the fall of 2011 at Arizona State University had HID Global showing how its solution can work with different handsets. The 32 participants were outfitted with one of three devices: RIM’s BlackBerry Bold 9650, Samsung’s Android (multiple models) or Apple’s iPhone 4G.

The pilot relied on microSD cards and sleeves for the NFC functionality because handsets that include NFC in the U.S. are not widely available. Three separate carriers–AT&T, Verizon and T-Mobile–were used for mobile services and the credentials were manually loaded on to the handsets.

HID’s solution will be handset and carrier agnostic. Because of the small size of the pilot and the control the school and vendors exerted over the pilot it was able to avoid some of the issues that may crop up during a full-scale rollout of placing the credential on the device.

That said the program was still successful. Approximately 80% of the ASU participants reported that using a smart phone to unlock a door is just as convenient as using their campus ID card. Nearly 90% said they would like to use their smart phone to open all doors on campus.

And, while the pilot was focused on physical access, nearly all participants also expressed an interest in using their smart phone for other campus applications including access to the student recreation center, as well as transit fare payment and meal, ticket and merchandise purchases.

HID also has a partnership with ISIS–the consortium of AT&T, Verizon and T-Mobile that will rollout NFC in 2012. This project will place the credential on the SIM, Weintz explains.

Expand focus

Having the choice to add applications and functionality to a device is important and may be critical in successful deployments of NFC. Neville Pattinson, vice president for Government Affairs, Standards and Business Development at Gemalto, says the mobile is going to impact three market–payments, transit and identity–and it should be up to the device owner which applications they choose.

“People are focused on one area, but you have to look at all three and the big picture,” Pattinson says. That means being able to use a handset to securely store identity credentials as well as access to public transportation and payment data.

It’s likely the mobile will store multiple sets of each type of data, Pattinson says. There may be one set of identity credentials for work and another for personal information. “We have a platform in our hands that becomes a multifunction device,” he says

It could take two to three years to define the policy issues that will guide the placement of identity credentials on secure elements, Gold predicts. Until then it’s going to be a waiting game as consumers load various identity apps in an application space that may not be fully secure. BYOD

In a “bring your own device” world, corporations are faced with a major challenge. Consumers expect to be able to load the applications of their choice on to their devices, but leads to serious security issues in enterprise environments.

Deloitte’s take on bring your own device is pretty straightforward, Duque says. “You’re damned if you do and damned if you don’t.”

To make it easier for the corporation it can come up with a list of approved handsets from which an employee can choose. This gives the employee some options, Duque says.

Otherwise it is bring your own device, and this creates issues that can literally change on a daily basis as new handsets hit the market, Duque explains.

A company can achieve some cost savings if they don’t reimburse for the purchase of mobiles devices and employees don’t have to carry multiple devices, which makes it more convenient for them.

But the disadvantages are numerous.

Employees buy devices and try to connect them to corporate resources without approval, circumventing security. There’s an increased cost, as IT staff must support multiple devices types. Trying to keep up with the potential attacks on the different handsets can be time consuming and expensive because each mobile operating system has different attack vectors.

The cons would seem to outnumber the pros but organizations are still wrestling with the issue. Duque also says organizations need to have policies in place for device configuration, devices use monitoring, data ownership and acceptable data use.

These policies issues can get thorny, says Jim Zok, director of Identity and Privacy Assurance at CSC. “If I bring in my device and want to use it for work what happens if I download something? You wipe the phone but will I get reimbursed?” he asks. “If you have a company phone does it have an approved app list?”

The viruses and malware attacks on mobile devices are ever growing. “There’s practically no way to protect these devices and put an app on it,” Zok says.

One solution could be two kernel handsets, says Zok. This would enable the device to have a business function and a personal function with strict segregation between the two sides. If one kernel is infected the other side would be able to function normally, he explains.

Mobile PIV

In the U.S. government space, enabling the mobile will take some significant policy changes. Computer scientists at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) are working on possible solution for government employees to have secure credentials on mobile devices. NIST released a revised FIPS 201-2 draft last year, and though the draft omitted mobile ID, government smart card officials say adding the capability is imperative.

The agency is exploring three options for enabling the PIV on a smart phone or tablet, says Bill MacGregor, a computer scientist at NIST. One is additional hardware that would connect the smart card to the mobile device, another is an enhanced PIV that would fully enable all functionality of the PIV’s contactless interface and last is use of a mobile device manager and a derived credential.

Contact smart card readers that use Bluetooth, WiFi or a cord to securely connect the PIV credentials to mobile devices already exist, MacGregor says. This option isn’t the most attractive because of the cost of the hardware and the form factor. “From a usability point of view it’s awkward and not realistic,” he adds.

Enhanced PIV

The other two options seem to be more realistic but each requires policy and technology changes. The phone could be used as a credential if the contactless interface of the PIV was fully enabled, MacGregor says. The first FIPS 201 version limited the amount of information that was available from the contactless portion of the card.

If these restrictions were eliminated, near field communication devices could read the PIV and authenticate to networks, sign and read email, and complete other tasks. To do this the process for creating a secure channel between the mobile and the credential would have to be created. “It’s easy to do technically but hard for the key management,” he says.

Since any NFC device would be able to read any PIV there would have to be a secure key placed on the mobile to make sure the credential is only being read by the properly authorized device. It would be a way to authorize the device to the credential.

Secure keys would have to be issued to the mobile devices, MacGregor says. This could be as simple as a pairing PIN that could be entered into the mobile to authorize pairing. “This doesn’t require too much more functionality,” he adds.

Derived credential

The other option is a derived credential and mobile device manager, MacGregor says. This option has the PIV presented to a mobile device manager which then assigns the credential to a device. The credentials would be placed on a secure element within the mobile.

Only a portion of the PIV functionality would be available with the derived credential and it’s possible that different derived credentials could be issued depending on the level of assurance necessary, MacGregor says.

“The chief negative of this approach is the complexity,” MacGregor says. “It needs interaction with a mobile device manager.”

Enhanced PIV and derived credentials are the focus of NIST’s current efforts to enable the PIV with smart phones, MacGregor explains. Derived credentials are also mentioned in NIST’s Special Publication 800-63-1 which focuses on electronic authentication.

The mention of derived credentials is in a generic form and not specific to PIV, says Hildegard Ferraiolo, a computer scientist at NIST. If derived credentials were to be included with PIV it would be included in the next draft of FIPS 201-2, which is expected sometime in the first half of 2012.

The notion of an enhanced PIV and derived credentials brings up some thorny policy issues, says Gemalto’s Pattinson. “NIST has a PKI policy that only allows digital credentials to be present on a smart card form factor,” he explains.

There is also an issue of dealing with the same credential in more than one place. “How do you end up with one card in your hand and another in the phone?” Pattinson questions. “You can’t have the same key in two places.”

This also doesn’t solve the problem of being able to decrypt email on mobile devices. “When a PKI credential is made on a PIV there are several keys and certificates associated with different functions, for example decryption, digital signature, key exchange, among others,” Pattinson says.

Decrypting an email is more complicated than it sounds. For a person to send an encrypted email there has to be an encryption public key certificate available to the sender to encrypt the email so only the recipient can read it, Pattinson explains.

The private key associated with this public key may be only known to the original PIV as it was generated on card at the time of issuance or activation. The private decryption key may never leave the card. In the case of a derived credential, if it does not have the original private key for decryption, there may not be an ability to decrypt the email.

However even this isn’t a hard and fast rule. Some agencies “escrow” the private decryption key initially generated off card or securely extracted off the card. This is done to allow for situations where cards are replaced or lost but the need to decrypt older email remains.

That’s just one example. Figuring out how to handle these policy issues is going to take some time, possibly one to two years, Pattinson predicts.

Technology issues

As the policy issues are being addressed, the technology continues to evolve. The lack of NFC handsets is one issue holding back mobile identity efforts, says Jon Callas, chief technology officer at Entrust. In the U.S. there are just a handful of NFC devices on the market, a couple of Blackberry and Samsung models but that’s it, he says.

Google with Android and Apple with iOS must progress to make identity better in mobile operating systems, Callas adds. He believes identity should be embedded into the device, and not the decision of third-party apps. Consumers should be able to control the identity as they wish, he explains.

“The operating system vendors will start to solve this problem by putting container support on the devices so that people can do identity on their own,” Callas adds.

Nobody buys a new handset based on identity, Callas explains. “Identity wasn’t on the list of reasons why I bought my phone,” he says. “You buy a mobile because you want that device.”

Though the mobile identity market has progress to make, both the technology and consumer adoption move quickly. Because handsets are relatively inexpensive they are replaced every one to three years, Callas explains.

While both the technology and policy need to advance before mobile identity is widespread this rapid pace of consumer adoption bodes well for the market. But officials must keep this pace in mind as they define policy. “Frankly, the technology is changing faster than we can keep up with,” says Zok.

What will mobile identity look like?

The goal of mobile credentialing is to enable an individual to have the same level of interaction with a system on the handset as they would on a laptop or desktop, says Jerome Becquart, vice president and general manager of identity assurance at HID Global.

HID acquired ActiveIdentity and its smart card middleware. The company is porting that software to the mobile device for access to secure email and virtual private networks, Becquart says. To date, however, the company hasn’t seen much call for the technology because the U.S. government’s policy requires the use of a smart card and PIN.

HID partnered with Good Technology to deliver new government-strength, two-factor mobile authentication and credentialing solutions for the iOS and Android platforms. The new solutions will couple the security capabilities of Good for Enterprise and Good for Government with the authentication technology of the ActivIdentity ActivClient Mobile middleware to make it easier for federal employees and the companies that support them to gain access to pertinent applications using their mobile device while maintaining necessary security levels set forth by their Information Assurance personnel.

Smart phones and tablets have not been able to achieve necessary levels of security but Good Technology and ActivIdentity are working to mobilize smart cards and the underlying secure element technology. This solution enables email and document encryption, cryptographic signing of emails and forms, and extends public key infrastructure authentication tools to custom applications previously not enabled on smart phones and tablets.

As the handsets gets more functionality the use will go beyond basic access to information, Becquart says. With NFC embedded physical access control can be added to the handset as well.

These converged physical and logical access systems will enable organizations to greatly increase security. Employees would have to wave their phone to gain access to the front door of a building, and if they didn’t authenticate at the door they won’t be able to access their computer.

The handset would also be the key for entry into the computer and instead of having to enter a long, complex password an individual might just have to remember a PIN, says Jon Callas, CTO at Entrust. Also, if an individual walks away with their handset the desktop would lock.

The GPS feature on smart phones could also play a part with security. If the network shows that someone is trying to remotely access email from an unusual location it could check the GPS on the employee’s smart phone to see if they are in that area. “Companies will be able to look at where you’ve been and determine if a transaction is too risky,” Becquart says.

Easy, yet secure, authentication on the mobile

Individuals want to do more and more with the mobile devices, but often the device itself is unprotected or using additional security is cumbersome.

A survey by Confident Technologies found that 65% of respondents reported using their personal mobile device to access work email or the company computer network, and more than half said they do not use a password or PIN to lock their smart phone or tablet. Some 44% of those who do not lock their mobile devices said that using a password is “too cumbersome.”

An additional 66% of respondents said they try to leave applications on their smart phones perpetually logged-in unless they are required by the application to log in every time.

Logging on to Web sites with mobile devices can be difficult. Even with handsets that have QWERTY keyboards it’s difficult to enter the complex user names and passwords required by some corporate sites. Confident Technologies is trying to make the mobile login process secure as well as easy, says Curtis Staker, president and CEO at the company.

With Confident’s image-based technology a user enrolls in the system by picking a category of photos, for example animals, and then chooses the specific images for their login. When returning to the site the individual is presented with a group of images in random order and taps the ones specific to their login.

The specific pictures and their location on the grid are different each time, forming a unique, one-time authentication code every time. All the user needs to do is remember a few categories and look for pictures that fit those categories. You get the usability without forsaking the usability,” Staker says.

GSMA: SIM-based NFC gains support of 45 mobile operators

The GSM Association announced that 45 of the world’s mobile operators have committed to supporting and implementing SIM-based NFC services.

Chief among these companies are China Mobile and China Unicom, which account for nearly 800 million subscribers throughout China. Other major operators include Deutsche Telekom, KT Corporation, Orange, SK Telecom, Telefónica, Telecom Italia, Turkcell, Verizon and Vodafone.

ISIS, the organization formed by AT&T, T-Mobile and Verizon to build a nationwide mobile commerce network in the U.S., has also announced its support for SIM-based NFC.

According to research firm Strategy Analytics, nearly 1.5 billion SIM-based handsets will be sold worldwide between 2010 and 2016, supporting transactions of more than $50 billion globally over the period.

SD Association, GlobalPlatform to include NFC in new SD standards

The SD Association has announced a new collaboration with GlobalPlatform to include smart chip technology in SD standards, enabling mobile phones and other portable devices to provide authentication services with SD memory cards.

Standardized authentication services on microSD and full-size SD memory cards could transform consumers’ mobile phones and devices into electronic wallets, enabling NFC-enabled cashless payments and paperless identification, plus a variety of value-added applications leveraging NFC.

According to the association, offering NFC on SD memory cards opens new business models for any authentication process, including:

  • Mobile commerce: Consumers can use devices equipped with smart microSD cards to make contactless payments for anything from groceries to subway fare.
  • Customized services: Content and service providers can customize features, offers and rewards automatically, eliminating manual entry of customer identifiers such as account or rewards card numbers. For example, airlines could automatically review customer accounts for upgrade and other frequent flier rewards.
  • Secure access/Personal ID: Users could store digital identification cards and redeem access control credentials on their mobile device.
  • Secure voice: Smart microSD cards can support hardware encrypted voice services, a security method used by governments, emergency services and corporations.
  • In each of these new business models, the microSD and full-size SD memory cards would provide the secure element, based on GlobalPlatform standards, for authorization purposes and would only be active in the authorized device.

By Zack Martin, Editor, Avisian Publishing
ᔥ via SecureIDNews: The Mobile ID experiment

EMV can be more than payments

Will the U.S. see additional apps with high-security cards?

It’s finally on the horizon: EMV chip cards are coming to the United States. EMV will give broader security against fraud than a traditional magnetic stripe, but it also opens the door to additional applications that could make the card a multi-purpose tool. Will U.S. issuers take advantage of EMV’s full range of capabilities beyond payment?

Because the EMV card is essentially a small computer, it’s capable of doing much more than payments. The chip itself is the equivalent of an IBM PC XT from the 1980s, explains Philippe Benitez, Gemalto’s vice president of marketing for Secure Transactions, North America. “The processor has the same amount of power as an old PC,” says Benitez.This means the chip has the capacity to enable other applications along side its secure payment functions.

The early days

Issuers began adding applications to EMV cards in the late 1990s, with loyalty programs being an early addition. According to a MasterCard case study, Turkey’s Garanti Bank became an early adopter when it launched the Bonus MasterCard multi-branded chip card in 2000. The card combined MasterCard credit with a loyalty program and public transportation services, all residing on the card’s chip.

Garanti established alliances with 5,000 merchants to take part in a single loyalty program. At 350,000 acceptance points, merchants track their customer purchasing patterns and cardholders earn cash back rewards.

Gemalto assisted in the launch of the card that ultimately increased Garanti’s market share in the country. “The [more] services they provide, the higher the utilization rate and retention rate,” says Benitez.

Transit apps

EMV chip cards can also support transportation applications including fare collection, ticketing and gas station and fleet applications.

Visa and Barclays issued the Barclaycard OnePulse card, that includes both credit and transit functionality. Launched in 2007, the card supports both EMV via the contact chip and a Visa payWave feature via the contactless interface. Additionally, the chip’s Oyster application can be used for travel on public transportation in London.

In a separate project, MasterCard partnered with the UK’s Manchester United football team for access and loyalty applications. A MasterCard-branded EMV card stores season tickets replacing paper tickets as the means to identify fans, says Benitez. The card also has a PayPass feature that enables contactless payment at bars and stands in the stadium.

In September 2011 Colsubsidio, the major compensation fund in Colombia, created the Colsubsidio Multi Service Membership Card. Members can use this card for EMV payments, as well as for additional services including an e-purse application, entrance to recreational parks and access to sport and convention centers.

The card’s contactless interface facilitates access to public transportation services in the city of Bogota. According to Benitez, this multi-application card is also used to distribute social benefits to cardholders, who then withdraw funds or use the card to pay for services at merchants.

Extra Security for Online Banking

In terms of online banking, EMV chip cards can carry applications for one-time password (OTP) authentication to help combat phishing attacks. This application is in wide use in parts of the world where cardholders commonly use a card in conjunction with an OTP token to access online banking, explains Benitez.

The EMV chip enables the issuer to add features to the card. The chip is segregated so that it has the ability to store files in different secure locations to ID the cardholder. This means a number of different apps could be used in conjunction with the EMV chip. “If you don’t want credit card information to be shared with other applications, there’s segregation in the card for that,” says Benitez.

When thinking about other possible apps for EMV chip cards, single sign-on (SSO) also carries potential. In 2004 scholars Andreas Pashalidis and Chris J. Mitchell wrote a paper proposing the use of EMV for SSO. In “Using EMV cards for Single Sign-On,” published in Euro PKI, the researchers propose a login plan where an EMV card acts as the authentication token.

Banks have not yet seized upon this opportunity, explains Mitchell. “As far as I know, banks have not added SSO functionality to their EMV cards.”

Challenges with adding Apps

While the possibilities for EMV applications can seem endless, Benitez says there are challenges to adding apps to the card. Because the card will always need to be read by some type of reader, the terminal side may require modifications, says Benitez.

Then there is the issue of security. Some applications may not be as secure as others that reside on the same chip. The payment application must be extremely secure, explains Benitez, so you can’t reduce its security when introducing additional applications.

Transit or student ID apps such as laundry, copying and building access can be as secure or as insecure as the owner of the application desires. The application can be open with data freely available to everyone … or it can be locked down like the Department of Defense’s Common Access Card, says Benitez.

It’s up to the application developer to decide how much security should be applied, but adding security to individual apps can add complexity. Multiple PINs for different applications can be cumbersome for end users.

When the application sits alongside a Visa or MasterCard EMV or other payment application, it must be certified by the payment brands, says Benitez.

Because EMV is still a few years from being fully rolled out in the U.S., there are still great opportunities for additional applications to be developed. Perhaps these programs from other parts of the world will serve as catalysts to U.S. issuers encouraging the addition of other services to these new payment cards.

Jill By Jaracz, Contributing Editor, Avisian Publishing

ᔥ via SecureIDNews: http://www.secureidnews.com/2012/04/09/emv-can-be-more-than-payments

The different contactless smart card flavors

Many types but do they play together?

In soft drink business, Coke and Pepsi might look the same, but consumers know that these two colas have different flavors. The market for contactless smart cards isn’t much different.

The four players that dominate the industry – HID, NXP, Sony and LEGIC – have subtle differences that create the different contactless flavors.

In addition to these differences, they also have similarities. They are all in the high frequency (HF) category, meaning that they operate in the 13.56 MHz spectrum and comply with either or both the ISO 14443 or ISO 15693 standard. The 14443 standard, however, is the “most dominant standard within the HF technology band used around the world,” says Bryan Ichikawa, vice president of Identity Solutions at Unisys.

Ichikawa says that the 14443 standard is broken down into an A and a B standard, basically because one standard was developed by a company that held a patent, and the other was developed by competing companies that also wanted to get into the market. “In readers you embed the ability to read both type A and B readers. That’s how you achieve interoperability,” explains Ichikawa.

Most contactless readers have the ability to read standard 14443 cards as well as one or more of the proprietary flavors. But, for example, a LEGIC reader typically won’t be able to read an HID iCLASS card and vice versa. There are exceptions, however, such as an agreement between HID and NXP that enables some iCLASS readers to read Mifare cards.

These flavors do hamper true interoperability and can complicate end user choice. But they also make contactless solutions usable out of the box, as they come ready made with onboard file structures and applications.

Truly standard 14443 and 15693 cards are available and they can be cheaper since they can be purchased from multiple vendors. But they are truly a blank slate and require applications to be added and or developed, which in turn adds cost.

When choosing what type of technology to deploy it comes down to what the end user wants to do with the card, Ichikawa says. “It comes down to cost and speed,” he adds.

NXP’s Mifare

NXP’s family of Mifare card and reader ICs is built on the ISO 14443 Type A standard. Mifare cards support multiple applications, each capable of operating independently of the others through user definable key sets and access conditions.

Readers are capable of reading any variety of Mifare card, and NXP certifies both cards and readers to ensure compatibility across generations.

According to Martin Gruber, segment director for the Transit Team at NXP, Mifare is the “overall umbrella brand” for a portfolio of products. Mifare Classic is the original NXP product that was introduced in 1995-96 when the 14443 standard was first released. Mifare Plus was launched in 2009 and features higher security than Mifare Classic. DESfire is the newest and most advanced product, providing the highest level of security and flexibility.

HID’s iCLASS

HID’s iCLASS platform operates at the 13.56 MHz frequency like its fellow contactless providers, but it uses the less common ISO 15693 standard, says David Nichols, director of market strategy at HID Global. The different standard, he says, enables a longer read range and longer keys for enhanced security. “We have a 64-bit key whereas others use a 48-bit key … the longer the key the more secure it will be,” he says.

The decision to go with 15693 instead of 14443 centered on usability. It provided a longer read range that was similar to HID’s well-established proximity card technology. When an organization switched from prox to iCLASS, we didn’t want the usability or performance to decrease, explains Nichols.

The ISO 15693 specification is divided into four parts and HID is compliant with the first two parts of the standard, Nichols says. After that is where iCLASS deviates with a specific access control application on the card and other changes.

HID buys standard 15693 chips for its iCLASS cards, but then makes some changes, Nichols says. HID thoroughly tests the cards and offers a lifetime guarantee. According to Nichols, this testing and reliability separates iCLASS from standardized cards.

While the cards use the 15693 standard, iCLASS readers are also equipped to read Mifare and ISO 14443 standard cards as well, Nichols says.

LEGIC Prime and LEGIC advant

LEGIC was founded in 1990 in Zurich, Switzerland. Though the company’s technology is available and in use in worldwide, it is most prevalent in Europe. LEGIC’s original 13.56 MHz contactless technology, LEGIC Prime, predates the development of the ISO standards for contactless. While Prime has been widely used since its launch in 1992, a newer and more secure line called advant is now available.

The LEGIC advant system is a set of products that includes cards, readers and applications, according to Marcel Brand, manager of marketing communications at the company. LEGIC ensures its card readers are compliant with both the ISO 14443 and ISO 15693 standards as well as its own proprietary technology.

LEGIC has designed its system to be flexible so that adding applications and upgrading readers can be done simply, says Brand.

Sony FeliCa

Sony’s FeliCa could be the most varied of the contactless flavors, complying with a different ISO standard.

To date it has seen the majority of its use in Asian markets, but the notion that it is only relevant in Asia is an image Sony is trying to correct. FeliCa was introduced in Hong Kong in 1997, says Jun Shionozaki, technical consulting manager for FeliCa Business Division at Sony. It was introduced to the Japanese market in 2001. “It’s deployed in other parts of Asia, Europe and the U.S.,” says Shionozaki.

FeliCa has an extremely strong presence in Japan because of the maturity of the country’s mobile market. As of June 2010, 67 million Japanese handsets embedded with mobile FeliCa chips were in circulation, says Shionozaki.

FeliCa is based on the ISO 18902 standard that defines near field communication. “We decided to focus on the 18092 standard which covers a wide range, including mobile,” says Shionozaki.

Some aspects of the FeliCa system are open. “We comply with 18092, in that sense we can be considered open,” says Shionozaki. FeliCa uses encryption algorithms that are open standard as well, but it maintains a set of proprietary security elements. Sony says its FeliCa card is the first contactless card to achieve EA4L security. “It’s the highest level for consumer products,” says Shionozaki.

Open standards

When it comes to the largest of issuances, such as open system payment cards and electronic passports, banks and countries have gone with purely standard 14443 technologies, says Patrick Hearn, vice president of government and identification markets for the America at Oberthur Technologies.

An open architecture was a necessity for these projects because of the millions of documents that would be produced and the variety of places the information on the credential would have to be read. “It’s easier to implement a large scale project using open standards,” he adds.

Open standards also tend to have longer lives, says Hearn. He estimates that a credentialing system based on open standards can last up to 10 years whereas proprietary systems may only last three to five years because they will be upgraded or phased out over time.

When someone buys a standard 14443 card they know how it’s going to communicate and they can purchase standard applications and personalization tools, Hearn says.

Ultimately it comes down to what a customer wants to do with the system, Heard adds. Though he stresses the importance of truly open standard solutions for large-scale implementations, he notes that proprietary flavors are ideal for other projects. “Closed loop makes sense for some people,” he says. “You have a steady supply chain and standardized output and don’t need the benchmark testing.”

 

By Jill Jaracz, Contributing Editor, AVISIAN Publications

Re-posted from SecureIDNews: http://www.secureidnews.com/2012/03/06/the-different-contactless-smart-card-flavors-many-types-but-do-they-play-together

A Comparison of PIV, PIV-­I, and CIV Credentials

A Comparison of PIV, PIV-­I, and CIV Credentials

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12) mandates a standard for a secure and reliable form of identification to be used by all Federal employees and contractors. Signed by President George W. Bush in August 2004, HSPD-12 initiated the development of a set of technical standards and issuance policies (Federal Information Processing Standard 201 [FIPS 201]) that create the Federal infrastructure required to deploy and support an identity credential that can be used and trusted across all Federal agencies for physical and logical access.

The policy, processes and technology in FIPS 201 also reflect specifications defined in a number of other special publications (SPs) specifically written for FIPS 201 and build on other National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards and SPs that support best practices. Importantly these standards also build on international and national standards from organizations such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) and others.

Two additional credentials have been defined – the Personal Identity Verification-Interoperable (PIV-I) and Commercial Identity Verification (CIV) credentials – with the goal of taking advantage of the infrastructure created by the Federal government’s PIV program. The policy, process and technology applied to each of these credentials result in a level of assurance and interoperability, and ultimately the extent to which it can be used and trusted in its intended application. As shown in the table below, the policy and process around PIV and PIV-I enable the interoperability and trust of the credential. The CIV credential definition was developed to define a commercial credential that could take advantage of the PIV infrastructure. Identity and credential infrastructure requires an additional investment in order to adhere to and maintain these policies and processes. In return, users and organizations can access identity and credential services in the commercial arena with many of the advantages enabled by the creation of the PIV infrastructure.

PIV PIV-I CIV
Policy
Breeder documents Follows FIPS 201 Follows FIPS 201 Follows the issuing
organization’s policies
Background checks National Agency Check
with Investigation
None required, directly
impacts level of suitability
for access
Follows the issuing
organization’s policies
Process
Application
Adjudication
Enrollment
Issuance
Activation
Follows FIPS 201,
including separation of
roles, strong biometric
binding
Follows Federal Bridge
cross-certification
certificate policies(1)
Follows SP 800-63-1 for
Federal issuance
Based on FIPS 201,
including separation of
roles, strong biometric
binding
Follows the issuing
organization’s policies
For Federal relying parties,
follows SP 800-63-1
Technology
Card data model Must follow SP 800-73 Must follow SP 800-73 “Follows” SP 800-73
(recommended)
Current primary credential
number
FASC-N(2) (requires Federal
agency code)
UUID (no Federal agency
code required)
UUID (recommended) (no
Federal agency code
required)
Object identifiers Federal Bridge Federal Bridge Organization Internet
Assigned Number
Authority (IANA) (if exists)
Types of Federation Levels of Assurance Policy
Trustworthiness Trusted identity, credential
and suitability
Trusted basic identity and
credential but not suitability
Trusted credential only
within the issuing
organization.
Trust among organizations Federal Bridge Clustered through Federal
Bridge
Clustered alone
Origin
Organization NIST Federal CIO Council Smart Card Alliance
Access Control Council(3)
Defining documents FIPS 201, SP 800-73 and
other related NIST
publications
Personal Identity
Verification Interoperability
for Non-Federal Issuers(4)
FICAM PIV-I FAQ(5)
The Commercial Identity
Verification (CIV)
Credential–Leveraging
FIPS 201 and the PIV
Specifications(6)
Motivation HSPD-12 Interoperable credential for
organizations doing
business with the
government and for first
responders
Commercial credential that
could take advantage of
the PIV infrastructure
Markets
Organization Federal agencies Federal agencies
Federal contractors
Commercial organizations
doing business with the
Federal government
State and local
governments
Critical infrastructure
providers
First responder
organizations
Commercial organizations
who are part of an industry
initiative and require an
interoperable, trusted
credential
Commercial organizations
seeking a credential for
use for their employees,
subcontractors, non-employee
visitors and
customers
Federal agencies who
accept credentials with
medium hardware
assurance(7)
Resources that the
credential may be used for
Credential can be used in a wide range of both employment-related and consumer based
transactions. Examples include physical access, logical access(8), mass transit,
and closed loop payments.

(1) http://www.idmanagement.gov/fpkipa/documents/FBCA_CP_RFC3647.pdf
(2) The FASC-N contains a federal agency code which is managed by NIST. PIV-I and CIV credential numbers
(UUIDs) are generated by the issuing organization. See NIST SP 800-87 for additional information.
(3) The Smart Card Alliance Access Control Council selected the name CIV and documented the specifications that
would define a credential that was technically compatible with the PIV specifications.
(4) http://www.idmanagement.gov/documents/PIV_IO_NonFed_Issuers.pdf
(5) http://www.idmanagement.gov/documents/PIV-I_FAQ.pdf
(6) http://www.smartcardalliance.org/resources/pdf/CIV_WP_101611.pdf
(7) Requires that the CIV credential have a medium hardware certificate.
(8) Logical access includes: computer logon, digital signatures, network access, application access, data/communication encryption.

About this Brief

This brief was developed by the Smart Card Alliance Access Control Council to provide an easy-to-use comparison of PIV, PIV-I and CIV credentials.

Access Control Council members involved in the development of this white paper included: AMAG Technology; Booz Allen Hamilton; Diebold Security; Marty Frary; HP Enterprise Services; Identification Technology Partners; Identive Group; IDmachines; Intellisoft, Inc.; NASA; NXP Semiconductors; Oberthur Technologies; Probaris; Software House/Tyco; U.S. Department of State; XTec, Inc..

Additional information on PIV-I and CIV credentials can be found in the following Smart Card Alliance white papers:

About the Access Control Council

The Smart Card Alliance Access Control Council is focused on accelerating the widespread acceptance, use, and application of smart card technology for physical and logical access control. The group brings together, in an open forum, leading users and technologists from both the public and private sectors and works on activities that are important to the access control community and that will help expand smart card technology adoption in this important market. Additional information can be found on the Smart Card Alliance Web site, http://www.smartcardalliance.org.

Re-Posted from Smart Card Alliance: http://www.smartcardalliance.org/pages/publications-a-comparison-of-piv-piv-i-and-civ-credentials

Using PKI for physical access control

Using PKI for physical access control

Physical security professionals are hearing about public key infrastructure, or PKI, more frequently than ever before. This is because the federal government, through the National Institutes of Standards and Technology and the Interagency Advisory Board (IAB), are pushing for higher security in the physical access control world.

The federal government says physical access control systems (PACS) need to be upgraded to be FIPS 201 and SP 800-116 compliant. Depending on the level of assurance required for entering the space, each door or turnstile will be secured by an authentication system capable of verifying one or more authentication factors before granting access.

A traditional access control reader provides one authentication factor, which results in “some” assurance. A single factor is the minimum standard for controlled access defined by SP 800-116. Readers with PIN pads can be used to provide two factors, and readers with a fingerprint sensor or iris scanner can provide three.

A FIPS 201-compliant contactless card reader must also ensure that the credential being presented is the one that was originally enrolled in the PACS rather than a forgery or clone.

Access control systems can use PKI at the door to accomplish this and determine a card’s authenticity. The process uses private and public keys to sign and verify a random challenge sent to the smart card. Only an original, legitimate card can respond correctly to the challenge.

Where does PKI at the door live?

There are three basic configurations for PKI at the door:

1. The challenge is generated at the panel and sent to the reader where it is passed to the card. The reader is effectively a transparent smart card reader that passes smart card commands and responses between the card and the panel. Cryptographic processing of the response from the card is performed at the panel and certificates and certificate revocation status are cached at the panel.

The advantage of this approach is that it does not require extra boards or equipment, and it is highly resilient because the panel is designed to operate offline from the server for long periods of time. The downside is that the panel needs to be upgraded to perform PKI at the door.

2. The challenge is generated at the PACS server and sent to the reader, which passes it to the card. The reader passes the response back to the server, which then verifies the response and issues a message to the appropriate hardware to unlock the door.

This solution works with all panels today can handle hundreds of doors concurrently. It has an early advantage because there is no need to update panel firmware. The disadvantage is that its reliability depends upon server availability, although this is mitigated with a backup server.

3. The challenge is generated by an additional board or controller and is sent to the reader, which passes it to the card. The reader passes the response back to the controller where it is verified. Depending on the verification results, the card identifier is sent to the access control panel.

There is no need to update the panel firmware with this approach. Because it operates closer to the door, it is designed to operate independently of a server for long periods of time – much like a panel. On the negative side, a separate controller adds cost in equipment and wiring.

With all three approaches, data is sent over multiple hops from the card edge to the PACS.

With each hop, the data needs to be secured using encryption.

Is PKI at the door for everyone?

All of this data processing takes time. Factors, such as the type of card and type of connectivity between devices, cause card authentication times to range from one to several seconds.

The good news is that once a cardholder has authenticated with the requisite factors to enter a particular area there is no need to re-authenticate unless a security area requiring even higher assurance is nested within it. Even then only the additional assurance factors are required. Therefore, security managers should plan their SP 800-116 security zones with an eye on minimizing cost while maximizing throughput and security.

What does the future hold for PKI at the door?

While a physical card is the primary means for gaining access into a high-assurance area, near field communications (NFC) is quickly becoming standard in mobile phones. With NFC, the phone becomes both a credential and a reader. Combined with cloud services, NFC can dramatically lower the costs of PKI at the door by eliminating panels and reducing wiring to an NFC terminal connected to a door relay.

This type of solution won’t work in every environment, but it will provide organizations with additional options, especially in the commercial market. NIST and IAB are already looking into this technology and security companies are gearing up for it.

The trickle down effect–where the mainstream market embraces technologies first implemented by the government–will play a large role in the adoption of PKI in the physical security market as a high assurance validation method.

 

By Bob Fontana, President and CTO, Codebench

Original Article from SecureIDNews: http://www.secureidnews.com/2012/02/27/using-pki-for-physical-access-control

 

What it takes to issue PIV-I credentials

What it takes to issue PIV-I credentials

In the early days of finance in England, bankers would routinely write letters of introduction for customers so they could access credit in other parts of the world. “If you had an account in good standing with a bank in England you would be given a letter of introduction and when you sailed to the new world you would use it to get a loan,” says Jeff Nigriny, CEO at CertiPath.

Today’s new world is online and identity credentials now take the place of these letters from hundreds of years ago. CertiPath enables other organizations to issue high assurance PIV-I credentials so that individual’s can be trusted in this new online world. “It’s not that a relying party knows who I am directly or even explicitly, it’s about trusting the issuer of the credential,” Nigriny explains.


Recently, CertiPath has taken financial services provider Citi through the process as well as HID Global. Both organizations are now certified to issue PIV-I credentials. Other organizations are also working to become certified, Nigriny says. The market potential for PIV-I is enormous with as many as 54 million credentials anticipated.

Many of these will be going to federal contractors but there’s also a market for first responders and health care workers. Additionally, Citi announced plans to issue high-assurance credentials to its customers as well.

With the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace and efforts to secure online identities in motion, PIV-I has been discussed as a possible option for citizens.

The road to PIV-I certification begins with paperwork, says Judith Spencer, chair of the Policy Management Authority at CertiPath. A company must explain their intent and how their PIV-I system will operate. At this stage we are trying to make sure the request is coming from a legitimate potential issuer, explains Spencer.

From there the request goes to CertiPath’s Policy Management Authority, an advisory group consisting of the existing CertiPath-enabled issuers. The group provides non-binding views to CertiPath on policy, technology and business practices related to the Bridge Certification Authority and approval of applicants for cross-certification.

Members of this group, through CertiPath, have credential interoperability and have been cross certified with the federal bridge through a common trust framework, Spencer says. “The members administer the framework and they’re able to see each other’s policies,” she explains. “That’s how we maintain the mutual trust.”

After approval from the authority the organization enters into a policy mapping service agreement which states that CertiPath will provide services that may lead to cross certification.

And then it’s a process of more back and forth. The company needs to provide a certificate policy and if it plans to offer encryption, a key recovery practice statement, Spencer says.

Then CertiPath maps the company’s certificate policy to its own. “It’s not about compliance but conformance and having compatible processes,” Spencer explains. “They don’t have to do it like we do it but we have to get the same results.”

CertiPath goes through the policy and provides a mapping report. “It contains questions we have or requirements if missing or inadequately covered,” Spencer says.

For example, a common issue is order process. CertiPath requires that an organization runs logs of the system and reviews them every two weeks. “From the time you flip a switch to turn on your certificate authority to when you turn it off everything needs to be continually audited for anomalies,” Spencer says.

CertiPath returns the results of the mapping to the company, which can then start a process of back and forth until the certificate policy mapping returns the same results.

After that’s accepted the company needs to write a certification practices statement (CPS). This is the organization’s standard operating procedure on how the service will be operated and how the certificate authority will be compliant with the certificate policy. For example, if the certificate policy says there is a secure facility that is protected from unauthorized access, the CPS would describe the facility and the credentials required for access to facilities and offices.

After that’s completed the organization must hire a third-party auditor experienced with PKI systems, Spencer says. The auditor looks at the certification practice statement and makes sure it’s fulfilled with the certificate policy.

If this is a new service and the organization doesn’t have any credentials issued, a “day zero audit” is performed. The auditor looks at the physical environment where the credentials will be stored and issued, the operations, the personnel and separation of duties. “The auditor is going to make sure people are actually doing what’s in the document,” she says.

While the audit is taking place, testing is done on the credentials the company wants to issue. The organization issues the four certificates and PIV-I compliant smart cards to CertiPath for testing, Spencer says. They are tested in CertiPath’s lab to make sure the certificate profiles are correct. Officials from the Federal PKI Authority are brought in to observe the tests.

The smart card has to be fully populated with the certificates, biometrics and containers, Spencer says. “It has to be a real operational card,” she adds.

CertiPath runs a suite of PIV-I tests on the card to make sure it operates correctly. If errors are found a report with explanations is delivered to the company. The look of the card is scrutinized during this process. “It must be visually distinguishable as a PIV-I card so it doesn’t appear to be masquerading as a PIV card,” Spencer explains.

Results of this testing along with the documentation of the applicant’s key recovery system goes to CertiPath’s Policy Management Authority. The group reviews the results and votes on whether the organization should be certified. From start to finish the process takes between six and twelve months depending on how quickly and organization can turn around documents and make the necessary changes, Spencer says.

But that doesn’t mean they’re done with the reports. After six months of issuing credentials a full operational audit has to be performed and submitted back to the Policy Management Authority. If the company hasn’t issued a significant number credential’s in that first six months they can get another six-month extension. But operational audits are required for all organizations every 12 months.

Defining the terms:

Policy management authority: An advisory group created by CertiPath that provides non-binding input on policy, technical and business practices related to the Bridge Certification Authority and approval of applicants for cross-certification.

Certificate authority: Core to a Public Key Infrastructure, the purpose of these trusted third parties is to issue digital certificates for use by other subordinate authorities, organizations, or individuals.

Certificate policy: A certificate policy is a document that defines the various actors in a PKI, their roles and their duties.

Certificate practice statement: An organization’s standard operating procedure on how the service will be operated and how the certificate authority will be compliant with the certificate policy.

Policy mapping service agreement: An agreement that identifies the appropriate assurance level for interoperability between all parties.

Article Shared from SecureIDNews (Thursday, February 16, 2012): http://www.secureidnews.com/2012/02/16/what-it-takes-to-issue-piv-i-credentials

Tech 101: Contactless smart cards

Tech 101: Contactless smart cards

Tuesday, December 13, 2011

A primer on radio frequency identification

For more than two decades, the contactless card has been a key tool in managing security, access and payments. Whether it’s used to open doors, facilitate public transit ticketing or mange multiple applications, contactless has become an essential element in many environments. But how does the technology enable all these uses without ever touching a reader?

Contactless cards use radio waves of specific frequencies as carriers for communication. Bryan Ichikawa, vice president for Identity Solutions at Unisys, explains that when used for identification applications radio frequencies come in three basic categories: low frequency, high frequency and ultra-high frequency. Each has a set of ideal applications.


Low frequency (LF) proximity cards operate at 125 or 134 kHz. These lower cost, lower security cards are typically used for door access applications.

High frequency (HF) products operate at 13.56 MHz and included the common ISO 14443 and 15693 standards. The vast majority of ID credentials are high frequency, says Ichikawa, adding that things like passports and bankcards use the ISO 14443 standard.

Ultrahigh frequency (UHF) operates at 433 to 953 MHz and has a longer range. “These cards can be read at 30 feet, but 10 to 15 feet is good accuracy,” says Ichikawa. UHF cards also work on different frequencies depending on geography and the allocation on the spectrum by the global standardization bodies and governments. UHF is commonly used in RFID tags for logistics applications and asset tracking.

Contactless components

The key component in a contactless card is an embedded integrated circuit (IC) chip that contains the applications and data that make the card functional. The chip is either a microprocessor with internal memory, or a memory chip with non-programmable logic. The components within the IC store, transmit and process data.

A contact smart card also has an IC chip but it is exposed on the card’s surface. In order to be read, it must be inserted into a card reader where physical contact enables the chip to power up and communicate.

In a contactless card, the chip resides completely within the card’s body. Because the chip isn’t exposed, it cannot be read via contact with a reader. Instead, the card only needs to come within proximity of the reader to be powered up.

Inside the card an antenna coil is connected to the chip, eliminating the need for an internal power source. “The major feature [of contactless] is that it has no battery … it’s powered by the field of the reader,” says Martin Gruber, segment director for the Transit Team at NXP.

An extra benefit is that the IC lasts longer because the plastic protects it, unlike the contact chip, which is exposed to the elements. “[The embedded chip] has a longer lifetime span of four to five years,” says Abu Ismail, senior engineer, Customer Application Support for NXP, adding that a contact chip’s lifespan is about two years.

The other part of the contactless system is the card reader. The card relies on the reader as both a power source and the means by which the card shares data. The reader has a primary coil and a secondary coil that generates a magnetic field, says Ismail. When the card enters the reader’s magnetic field, it accesses the power it needs to turn on.

As the card is held in proximity to the reader, it transfers data to the reader. With the radio frequency connection there is no limit to the amount of data that can be transmitted between the two. The speed at which data can be transferred to the reader varies. Ismail says an NXP Mifare card has speeds up to 848 KB per second.

Contactless cards are also equipped with a unique identification number (UID) that enables the reader to properly identify them. This is important in case of collision, when multiple cards try to talk with a reader at once. “It’s like three kids in school. You say, ‘Tell me your name,’ and they all speak at the same time. Then you ask them to go alphabetically to get them to speak [one at a time],” says Ismail.

“In a similar process, the reader is sending the command, ‘Give me your unique ID,’ explains Ismail. If all cards answer at the same time, anti-collision processes enable identification to occur one card at a time.

The identification of a specific card happens much quicker than getting children to respond one at a time. “If you have one card, the detection is 3 to 3.5 milliseconds, depending on the size of the UID,” says Ismail. Adding two cards at the same time adds an additional 2.5 milliseconds, and two more cards adds another 2.5 milliseconds to reading time.

In terms of security, Ismail says a contactless card can support two different types of algorithms, Data Encryption Standards (DES) and Advanced Encryption Standards (AES). DES has a block size of 192 bits, whereas AES, which is perceived as a stronger type of security, has a 128-bit block size. The type of security within the card depends on the application for which it’s used, says Ismail. Each encryption standard secures the data on a card in a different way.

Contactless applications

Contactless cards are ideally suited for specific applications. One of these is public transportation, an application that NXP started working on in the mid-nineties. “The Mifare pilot was the Seoul Metro in 1994, with the rollout in 1996,” says Gruber, adding that Seoul was “really the first city ever” to implement a contactless card payment system.

Now cities all over the world, including Chicago, London and Boston, use contactless cards as an efficient way to board passengers. Users wave the cards over readers and are granted almost instant access. This short transaction time paired with the high-speed communication between the card and reader makes it an optimal solution. Plus, because the card doesn’t come into contact with the reader, there’s less wear and tear on the card, increasing its lifespan.

Physical access control is another application best addressed by contactless cards, with employees at businesses all over the world gaining access to their workplaces through a simple tap of a card to a door reader.

However, contactless cards aren’t the answer for every application. “There are two enemies to these technologies: Steel and water,” says Ichikawa.

Steel blocks radio waves, which is why the newest passports have steel cloth woven into their covers. “You can’t read it when it’s closed,” says Ichikawa.

Ichikawa also notes that since the human body is made mostly of water, the current trend in Mexico of implanting an RF tag in one’s shoulder to help locate you if kidnapped should be avoided. “If you put an RF card right next to your body, the body will absorb the radio waves, and there’s nothing to bounce back,” says Ichikawa.

“There are general laws of physics here that make things pretty hard,” says Ichikawa.

From SecureIDNews: 

http://www.secureidnews.com/2011/12/13/tech-101-contactless-smart-cards

Convergence. What’s that?

Locking down your building and locking down your network are security functions that use very similar technology.
Most managers want to consolidate these two environments to save money while enhancing security.  With the ongoing progress being made in smartcard technology, companies can integrate (CONVERGE) two security environments – logical and physical – to provide consolidated management and a total security view.
One Credential, multiple functions

Call your ID Experts today to find out how we can converge your security environments.

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