Feds say measures in place to mitigate risk of sharing immigration information with other countries, private sector.
The Canadian government’s introduction of two new programs could involve the sharing of sensitive personal information, such as fingerprints, from government to private-sector companies, and from government to government, which has privacy advocates concerned whether proper safeguards are being used to minimize risk.
The government is taking a page from its allies in introducing biometrics to better identify immigrants to Canada. Biometrics refer to a person’s unique measurable physical characteristics or behaviour traits. For most immigration-related purposes, they refer to fingerprints.
“Implementing biometrics will bring Canada in line with other countries,” states Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s website.
The United States, it says, has required fingerprints and a photo of all foreigners, except Canadians, entering its territory since 2004. Japan and the United Kingdom have done the same since 2007. Australia started collecting fingerprints and photos for visa applications made in 15 countries in 2010.
The government says it’s keeping Canadians safe by introducing biometrics to help prevent identity fraud and theft, bar access to criminals, and stop deportees and failed refugee claimants from re-entering using false documents. It cites a “global rise of identity fraud and theft and the use of sophisticated means to evade detection” as presenting challenges to Canada’s immigration program.
In 2010, foreigners used 454 fraudulent Canadian visas to travel to Canada, using such techniques as altered and counterfeit documents and identity fraud.
Temporary resident project
For all these reasons, the government is increasing its use of biometrics for immigration purposes, including through the Temporary Resident Biometrics Project. Starting next year, people in some countries will have to give their fingerprints and be photographed when applying for temporary Canadian residency through a visa, study permit, or work permit.
The RCMP will receive the ‘digital’ fingerprints and check them against their criminal, refugee claimant, deportee, and temporary resident application records.
If the person is cleared for entry, Canadian border agents will check that the visa holder is the same person to whom the visa was issued when the person arrives at Canada’s front door, using the photo taken abroad. They may check the person’s fingerprints at their discretion.
Which countries will be targeted first is unclear. When asked in a series of written questions, Citizenship and Immigration Canada spokesperson Nancy Caron responded, “CIC will focus its resources and funding where they are needed most—where risks of identity fraud are the greatest.”
And Canada may not even pursue visa seekers from all countries.
Scott Hutchinson, speaking for the privacy commissioner’s office, which has been monitoring the program’s implementation, noted in written answers to Embassy‘s questions this week: “the scope…appears to have shifted from looking at applicants from all visa-required countries to a focus on selected countries.”
The 2008 budget set aside money for the project’s full-scale implementation: $174 million over five years without GST and HST. In 2010-11, Citizenship and Immigration, the lead department, estimated the whole project’s actual cost would be about $180 million, including GST and HST, from 2007-8 to 2013-14. The department was given the go-ahead in March 2011 to move from planning to roll-out, which meant tendering for the design, development and testing of the biometrics system needed to get the project off the ground. The government’s procurement website does not indicate that a firm has been chosen.
The project involves using government-run visa offices and third-party visa applications centres (mostly run by private-sector companies) to collect an applicant’s biometric data. Canada already uses non-government-run visa application centres to collect personal information of temporary resident applicants in 41 countries.
“Protection of personal information is a primary consideration for the government of Canada when choosing any service provider,” wrote Ms. Caron.
“Technological safeguards will be in place to ensure that client information is collected, stored, encrypted and transmitted securely.”
A private-sector company contracted to collect the sensitive biometric information must sign a formal agreement including security and privacy requirements. If it doesn’t follow the terms, the government could cancel the deal.
But NDP immigration critic Don Davies still has concerns.
“When people who want to visit Canada…they’re asked to turn over information, the highest guarantee of respect for privacy and security is to give that information directly to the government of Canada,” he said.
“I think it’s just a matter of logic that when that information is turned over to visa application centres or other private-sector providers, that clearly increases the vulnerability to breaches of privacy and security.”
He also expressed concerns over another program that is already up and running.
Five Country Conference
Canada is a member of the Five Country Conference, a forum on migration security issues, alongside the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.
Through bilateral agreements, they have agreed to a High Value Data Sharing Protocol, to share biometrics of non-citizens with each other for immigration purposes only. Canada is sharing 3,000 fingerprints each year with each partner, covering mostly refugee claimants, but also immigration enforcement cases.
Information sharing might involve Canadian immigration officials having reason to believe someone seeking to live in Canada may have previously shown up on New Zealand’s doorstep, for example. Canada can then securely transmit the person’s encrypted fingerprints only to New Zealand for a system search.
Within three days, New Zealand will check for a match through its records. If it finds one, it may give basic information on that person, such as photos, passport numbers, their birthday, and nationality to the Canadians. Depending on the case, the countries could exchange further information.
Canada’s immigration application forms tell applicants that their information may be shared with foreign governments.
A third party did a privacy impact assessment of the sharing protocol in 2009 with recommendations to mitigate privacy risks, to which all government agencies involved agreed and began implementing. Canada is working with its Five Country Conference partners to ensure privacy by, for instance, making sure all fingerprints are anonymously shared and can’t be linked to a person unless a match is made, destroying fingerprints once a search is done, and exchanging more information only after a match is made.
They use encryption and security tools to protect files shared electronically. Everything passes through a secure central server in Australia.
Canada knows information shared between countries is being kept secure because they’ve each signed memoranda of understanding with each other governing how the information is to be managed, said Ms. Caron.
Memoranda of understanding, a common way of formalizing agreements between governments internationally, are not legally binding. But the agreements signed through the sharing protocol let one participant country audit another’s data sharing safeguards outlined in their memorandum of understanding, said Ms. Caron. And if a problem pops up, countries can stop sharing information until they’re happy it’s been resolved.
“Robust mechanisms are required to track and audit information sharing to ensure countries comply with data security and privacy requirements,” she said.
Mr. Davies said he doesn’t know what “robust mechanisms” means because Canada has not made the memoranda of understanding public and they haven’t been debated in Parliament.
He also takes issue with a clause in the United States privacy impact assessment of the information sharing regime that says access to Five Country Conference information is given to Department of Homeland Security contractors with security clearances “and a justified need to know.”
“In practice, do we really have the capacity, the resources, the time to really track and audit information-sharing right through US Homeland Security and through private contractors?” questioned Mr. Davies.
“You know, it sounds good in theory. But I have my doubts.”
Micheal Vonn, policy director with the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, expressed similar concerns with information exchange with other governments and private contractors that don’t share the same privacy culture and structure as Canada.
In the United States, for instance, “Their entire system is created to share data throughout the system everywhere from national security down through domestic policing,” he said.
“Because their entire system is structured in that fashion, we’re certainly swimming upstream to suggest that this tiny subset of data be held in a completely separate silo and never be introduced into any of these giant repositories.”
No one in the United States government could be reached to respond to questions before deadline.
Another clause in the American privacy impact assessment notes: “FCC partners do not share information exchanged under this protocol with non-FCC partners without the permission of the FCC partner(s) that originally provided the information.”
Ms. Caron said that Canada and its FCC partners won’t let shared information fall into the hands of people or governments from which a person is seeking protection. But she didn’t respond to a question about whether Canada has ever agreed to such an information transfer to a country beyond the five countries signing agreements with each other and setting down protective privacy and security measures.
“While we have to always be improving our systems to ensure security, I’m still most comfortable with Canada as a sovereign country retaining control over information in our borders. And at least that way there are civil servants, politicians, and legal mechanisms that Canadians can hold accountable if something goes awry,” said Mr. Davies.
Mr. Vonn also said there just isn’t enough information about the scope of the problem to know whether the use of biometrics as a solution would be effective, proportional and necessary.
He also noted the severe impact of a screw-up. One door closed to a refugee claimant effectively means that the person won’t be allowed in the other four countries as well, he said.
Mr. Davies said he is interested to question immigration officials, as the House immigration committee is set to begin a study in February of the security of Canada’s immigration system, which will cover biometrics.
For his part, Mr. Hutchinson of the privacy commissioner’s office said it is “satisfied that CIC is taking its privacy responsibilities as part of the protocol seriously, and with the fact that it has been receptive to much of our advice.”
Looking to the future, Ms. Caron said, “Our experience so far has shown that there is value in information sharing and we are exploring opportunities to enhance information-sharing for immigration purposes.”
The government has cited “successes” in that as of May 31, 2011 it has sent 10,303 fingerprint records to its partner countries for matching against their biometric holdings, resulting in 1,108 matches and 203 referrals to the CBSA, for instance, that led to the realization of misrepresentation of facts in a refugee case, or that someone the government thought was missing in Canada has in fact left the country.
Canada’s greatest match rate was with the United States (38.7 per cent) and the UK (5.2 per cent).
kshane@embassymag.ca
ᔥ via Embassy Magazine: http://www.embassymag.ca/page/view/biometrics-01-11-2012
